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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the long run relationship between growth and unemployment in a
labor market with matching frictions when there is individual and collective wage setting.
Whereas in the short run both variables interact, that is, a higher rate of growth implies
more capital accumulation and, then, more employment and a higher level of employment
implies more income and, then, more capital accumulation, in the long run the e¤ect
changes. In innite horizon (Ramsey) models with unemployment if the production func-
tion is neoclassical (neoclassical growth model) and there is exogenous labor augmenting
technological progress, being the growth rate x, it turns out that in the long run steady
state, output per e¢ cient person is constant. This means that the long run rate of growth
of income per capita is equal to the exogenous rate of technological progress x, that is, of
course, independent of the long run employment level. The reason is that, independently
of the e¤ects of employment on growth, in the long run, due to the decreasing marginal
product of capital, "growth always stops". Then, in papers with this set up, employment
does not a¤ect growth in the long run and the only thing to check is that if growth, that
is the exogenous rate of technological progress x, a¤ects employment.
This is done in a model without matching frictions in the labor markets by Raurich
and Sorolla (2014). In this model wages are set by rms (e¢ ciency wage model) and it
turns out that without wage inertia growth does not a¤ect employment in the long run
but if we assume wage inertia growth has a positive e¤ect on employment in the long run.
In models with matching frictions, Pissarides (1990, chapter 2), with individual wage
setting, nds that an increase in the growth rate of productivity x reduces unemployment
due to a capitalization e¤ect of the rm when the interest rate r is exogenous (whereas
Aghion and Hobbit (1991), adding "creative destruction" obtain a hump-shaped relation-
ship). In order to endogenize the interest rate he uses a dynamic IS-LM model concluding
that the e¤ect of x on employment depends (as we will see) on the term r   x, and, with
the dynamic demand postulated, this e¤ect is di¢ cult to analyze because it depends on
the slopes of two curves (P.38). Eriksson (1997) endogenizes the interest rate using the
neoclassical growth model and, with an ad hoc individual wage setting equation, obtains
that the e¤ect of growth on employment depends on the parameter of constant relative
risk aversion  of the utility function. This is because the long run interest rate is given
by r =  + x, where  is the subjective discount rate. He obtains that if  > 1 then
growth has a negative e¤ect on employment and the opposite occurs if  < 1. Looking at
these di¤erent e¤ects of growth on employment one may ask if the di¤erence is due to the
di¤erent wage setting system used.
Moreover all these results are presented in the neoclassical set up that considers that
wages, capital and labor are set simultaneously, but Stole and Zwiebel (1996) raise the
case of the strategic behavior of the rm when it sets employment before wage setting.
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This case has been embedded by Cahuc et al. in a labor market with frictions and capital
(the Pissarides model with a large (multiworker) rm) in a series of papers (Cahuc and
Wasmer (2001) and Cahuc et al. (2008)) showing that the specic timing may change
optimal conditions for choosing capital, labor and wages. Under these circumstances one
may suspect that the e¤ect of growth on unemployment may also be di¤erent. The purpose
of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of growth on employment for di¤erent wage setting
systems (individual or collective) and di¤erent timing when choosing capital, labor and
wages in a labor market with frictions.
When the production function is not nally neoclassical, that is, ends up being an
AK function due to externalities or public capital, it may be the case, depending on the
"educated" way of dening the externality, that employment a¤ects growth in the long
run. This happens for example in Bean and Pissarides (1993) with matching frictions,
where matches last for one period, and an OLG model; Daveri and Tabellini (2000),
without matching frictions and an OLG model; or Eriksson (1997) with matching frictions
and an innite horizon model. Here we concentrate on neoclassical production functions
that do not generates endogenous growth. We focus on standard individual and collective
wage setting systems deriving wage equations from optimization programs and, then, we
improve Eriksson (1997), where he only analyzes individual wage setting using an "ad hoc"
wage setting function. This paper also di¤ers from Raurich and Sorolla (2014) because in
here we assume matching frictions and individual and collective wage setting instead of
no frictions and e¢ ciency wages.
There are many papers that compare individual and collective wage setting in models
with matching frictions without growth for analyzing other issues. Bauer and Lingens
(2013) analyze if collective wage bargaining (compared to individual wage bargaining)
restores e¢ ciency. Ebell and Haefke (2006), in a model with imperfect competition in the
goods market, study which bargaining regime emerges as the stable institution. De la Croix
(2006), in a model with imperfect competition in the goods market, the e¤ect of di¤erent
wage setting systems on employment. García and Sorolla (2013) in a model with matching
frictions where matches last for one period which wage setting system generates frictional
unemployment and Ranjan (2013) the role of labor market institutions on o¤shoring.
Our results say that the e¤ect of growth on the employment rate depends on the role
of labor market institutions, specically, on the timing of wage setting with respect to
capital and labor, on the type of wage bargaining: individual or collective, and on the
way of nancing the unemployment benet , having that an increase in x may increase,
decrease or leave una¤ected the long run rate of employment. However we obtain that
for a high value of the constant relative risk aversion parameter of the individual utility
function , for almost all labor market institutions, an increase in the long run rate of
growth decreases the long run rate of employment, that is, growth is bad for employment.
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On the contrary, if this coe¢ cient is small, for almost all labor market institutions, growth
is good for employment. These results based on a parameter of the utility function may
seem surprising because the usual explanation for a positive e¤ect of labor productivity
on employment in the long run is that wages must increase less than labor productivity
and it seems strange to have a wage equation where the rate of growth of wages depends
on a parameter of the individual utility function. The explanation is that, in models with
matching frictions, employment (and sometimes wages) also depends on the interest rate
r due to the existence of labor turnover costs and this is the channel that introduces the
e¤ect of  on employment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the agents
of the model. In section 3 we derive the full dynamic system, section 4 presents the steady
state and section 5 computes the value functions in the steady state. Section 6 presents
the results for the Nash solution, where capital, labor and wages are set simultaneously.
Section 7 analyzes the Stole and Zwiebel case, where capital and labor are set simultane-
ously and before the wage. Section 8 the opposite case when the wage is set before capital
and labor which are decided simultaneously. Section 9 concludes with a summary of the
results in a table.
2 The Market Economy
2.1 Labor Market Flows
We assume matching frictions in the labor market where the matching function is X(t) =
m(V (t); U(t)) where X are matches1, V vacancies and U the amount of unemployment.
Then U = (N   L) where N is the total size of the work force that grows at the constant
rate n and L is employment. We assume that m has constant returns to scale and mV > 0
and mU > 0. Then we dene XV = m(1;
1
V
U
)  q() where   V
U
is the degree of the labor
market tightness, and one can show that q0 < 0. Also we dene X
U
= V
U
X
V
= q() where
one can show that d(q())
d
> 0. Assuming that a proportion 0 <  < 1 of employed people
loose the job, then employment ows are given by the di¤erential equation:
_L = X   L = q()V   L = q()V
U
U   L = q()(N   L)  L. (1)
2.2 The Family
We assume a big family that chooses the consumption of each member of the family C
in order to maximize a CRRA utility function subject to the usual sequential budget
constraint, where B is the total amount of assets,  prots, b0 the unemployment benet,
1t is a continous variable and omitted when not necessary.
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! the real wage, r the real interest rate and V I the vacancy income that a rm pays and
we assume goes to the consumer. The program is then to choose C in order to maximize:Z 1
0
e t
C1 
1  Ndt
subject to:
_B = rB + (1  w)!L+ b0(N   L) +  + V I   C:N
where  > 0 is the constant relative risk aversion coe¢ cient.
As usual the Euler equation is given by:
_C
C
=
1

(r   ),
that rewritten in terms of consumption per e¢ cient person c  C
A
; where A grows at
the constant exogenous rate x, gives2:
_c
c
+ x =
1

(r   ),
that is:
_c
c
=
1

(r     x).
2.3 The Multiple-Worker (Large) Firm
We assume a neoclassical production function Y = F (K;AL) where A (the labor augment-
ing technological progress or "labor productivity"3), as we said, growths at the constant
rate x: The rm chooses simultaneously L,K and V in order to maximize its value function
VF , that is, the sum of discounted prots along life,
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt [F (K;AL)  (1 + F )!L  0V   I] dt (2)
subject to the employment ow equation given by (1):
_L = q()V   L
2In order to have the integral well dened we need to assume  > (1   )x + n, this means that
  (1  )x > n and, in particular, + (   1)x > 0:
3We say "labor productivity" between quotes because the usual denition of labor productivity is
Y
L = F (
K
L ; A) that increases either if A increases or if
K
L increases.
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and the capital accumulation equation:
_K = I   K,
that is, the rm maximizes
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt
"
F (K;AL)  (1 + F )!L  0
_L+ L
q()
 

_K + K
#
dt
where I is investment,  is the exogenous depreciation rate, F a pay roll tax rate and
0 the cost of open a vacancy. If the cost of open a vacancy changes along time then we
obtain the following rst order conditions, given by the Euler equations VK  @V _K@t = 0 and
VL   @V _L@t = 0, that are the capital demand equation:
FK = r +  (3)
and the employment equation:
FL = (1 + F )! + 0
r +   _0
0
+ q
0() _
q()
q()
. (4)
where one interprets the term 0
r+  _0
0
+
q0() _
q()
q()
as the turnover cost4. As one can see the
assumption about how 0 changes is important because it is going to change the amount
of employment decided by the rm. We assume that 0 is proportional to the wage that
is 0 = !
5.
In this case the rm maximizes:
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt
"
F (K;AL)  (1 + F )!L  !
_L+ L
q()
 

_K + K
#
dt
And the rst order conditions are the (exogenous wage) capital demand equation:
FK = r +  (5)
and the (exogenous wage) employment equation6:
4See, for example Cahuc et al. (2008).
5This assumption is standard in the literature (see for example Pissarides (1992)) but not neutral. For
di¤erent assumptions about the evolution of 0(t) along time (0(t) = , 0(t) = A(t),
_0(t)
0(t)
= ,...)
the main results about the long run relationship between growth and employment may change as we will
mention later.
6We refer to these equations as the (exogenous wage) because the rm takes the wage as given. This
will change later when we analyze strategic interactions.
6
FL = (1 + F )! + 
(r +   _!
!
+ q
0() _
q()
)
q()
! =
24(1 + F ) +  (r +   _!! + q0()q() _ )
q()
35! (6)
Note that now the change of wages a¤ect optimal employment, this is precisely one
channel that implies that growth a¤ect employment in the long run because in the steady
state (the e¢ cient wage !
A
is going to be constant and ) the rate of growth of wages _!
!
is
equal to the exogenous productivity rate x. Moreover the long run interest rate will also
depend positively on x and then the crucial point is that if an increase of x increases or
reduces the term r   _!
!
and, then, the turnover cost.
2.4 Equilibrium in the Output Market
Now we dene k = K
AN
as capital per e¢ cient person and we denote the employment rate
as l = L
N
. From the budget constraint of the family, assuming that the government has
a balanced budget constraint and that the capital market is in equilibrium one obtains7
the usual feasibility constraint/capital accumulation equation/equilibrium output market
equation in terms of variables per e¢ cient person:
_k = F (k; l)  c  (n+  + x)k.
3 The Dynamic Model
We can rewrite the labor market ows equation in terms of the employment rate as:
_l = q()(1  l)  (+ n)l. (7)
The Euler equation is:
_c
c
=
1

(r     x). (8)
If we dene the capital per e¢ cient unit of labor (the capital per e¢ cient labor ratio)
as k^ = K
AL
, the intensive production function as f(k^) = F (K;AL)
AL
and the wage in e¢ ciency
units as w = !
A
, then we know that FK = f(k^) and FL = A
h
f(k^)  k^f 0

k^
i
that
substituted respectively in (5) and in (6) give the:
Capital demand:
7To obtain this equation is not trivial because one has to specify how the rm nances it investment:
retaining prots, issuing bonds,... this is discussed in the seminal paper of Abel and Blanchard (1983)
but at the end all the alternatives gives, as it should be, the feasibility constraint.
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f 0

k^

= r +  (9)
and the Employment equation:
f(k^)  k^f 0

k^

=
!
A
24(1 + F ) +  (r +   _!! + q0()q() _ )
q()
35 ,
that is,
f(k^)  k^f 0

k^

= w
24(1 + F ) +  (r +   _ww   x+ q0()q() _ )
q()
35 : (10)
Also we can rewrite the capital per e¢ cient labor ratio as:
k^ =
K
AL
=
K
AN
L
N
=
k
l
, (11)
meaning that the capital per e¢ cient labor ratio is, in fact, the amount of capital per
e¢ cient person divided by the employment rate. The capital accumulation equation is
_k = f(k; l)  c  (n+  + x)k. (12)
Adding nally a general wage equation8
! = ~!(:); that is, w =
~!(:)
A
(13)
the dynamic model is given by the seven equations: (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13),
being the endogenous variables r, k^, , l, w, k and c. Finally income per e¢ cient person
is given by:
y = F (k; l),
and product per e¢ cient unit of labor:
y^ = f(k^).
8The derivation of a specic wage equation outside the steady state is di¢ cult to obtain if the program
for its derivation is based on workers and rm value functions that take into acount discounted along life
labor and rm income because they depend on _ and _L. The only way to obtain a tractable wage equation
in this situation is to use programs based on current wages and prots.
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4 The Model in the Steady State for a General Wage
Setting Equation
Assuming that the model converges to an steady state we have that in this steady state
_k = 0 (that means _y = Y
AL
= 0, that is (
Y
L )
0
(YL )
= x, that is, as usual, the long rate of growth
of income per capita is given by the exogenous rate of labor augmenting technological
progress x), _w = 0, _c = 0, _ = 0 and _l = 0.
The endogenous variables are: r, k^, , l, w, k and c that are given by the:
Euler equation
r = + x (14)
which means that the long run interest rate is given by the subjective discount rate 
plus the exogenous rate of technological progress (multiplied by  > 0). Then an increase
in x increases the long interest rate, decapitalizing the rm using Pissarideswords because
discounted prots along life decrease.
Capital demand:
f 0(k^) = r +  (15)
Employment equation: now the employment equation becomes9:
FL =

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

! (16)
where as in the usual case without vacancy costs (FL = (1 + F )!) an increase in the
wage reduces employment, the novelty here is that employment is also a¤ected by labor
market tightness via turnover costs having that an increase in  increases employment.
Note also that this is a crucial equation for the e¤ect of growth on employment because r
and x, the long run rate of growth appears in the expression and this concrete expression
has been obtained assuming 0 = !
10. As Pissarides (1990) says (P. 38) the long run
e¤ect of growth on employment depends on the term r   x. Pissarides (1990) nds r
using a dynamic IS-LM model, but using the Ramsey model (as Eriksson (1997) does)
the term r   x becomes  + (   1)x having that an increase in x increases (decreases)
the turnover costs if  > (<)1 decreasing (increasing) then employment. This is the rst
channel for the e¤ect of growth on employment: the employment equation e¤ect that it is
the unique channel that appears in Eriksson (1997) paper. The equation in terms of k^ is:
9This is equation (2.25) in Pissarides (1990) without F .
10Without this assumption the employment equation becomes FL = (1 + F )! + 0
r+  _00
q() . If we
assume 0 = A then we get a similar expression that is FL = (1 + F )!+A
r+ x
q() with the complication
that depends on A. But if we assume a constant 0 then we get FL = (1 + F )!+0
r+
q() and in this case
the employment equation does not depen directly on x.
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f(k^)  k^f 0

k^

= w

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

(17)
Wage equation:
! = ~!(:) that is w =
~!(:)
A
(18)
Equilibrium of labor market ows:
l =

q()
+ n+ q()

=
"
1
1 + +n
q()
#
(19)
It is interesting to note that q() = X
U
5 1 which means that the equilibrium of
the labor markets ows equation implies that as long as 0 <  < 111 the long run rate
of employment l < 1, meaning that there is always unemployment in the long run. This
equation also implies that when  increases l increases.
Capital per e¢ cient labor ratio k^ equation:
k^ =
k
l
(20)
Capital accumulation equation:
c = F (k; l)  (n+  + x)k (21)
The solution of the model is recursive : r = +x is given by the Euler equation (14),
k^ (and then y^ = f(k^), that is labor productivity) is given by the capital demand equation
(15). If it turns out that the wage equation depends on k^, that is w = ~!(:)
A
= !^(k^), then
substituting it in the employment equation we have an equation that depends on k^, r, and
12 so the employment and wage equation gives , then the equilibrium of labor market
ows gives l, the capital per e¢ cient labor equality gives k and the capital accumulation
equation c. Only in one of the cases presented the wage equation determines l, which
implies that then the equilibrium of labor market ows gives , the employment equation
gives w, the capital per e¢ cient labor equality gives k and the capital accumulation
equation c.
Finally
y = F (k; l)
and
11The case  = 1, that means that matches last for one period, must be analyzed separed and this is
done in García and Sorolla (2013).
12In fact, with almost all the specic wage equations derived we will have that the substitution of the
wage equation on the employment equation gives an equation that depends only on r and  because k^
vanishes.
10
y^ = f(k^)
What we are going to do now is to derive specic wage equations in the steady state
depending on the type (individual or collective) and timing of wage setting.
5 Value Functions in the Steady State
We denote the value function of an employed worker, that is, his expected discounted
labor income along life that takes into account that he can change from employment to
unemployment with the constant probability  as VE. Then, as usual, the following asset
value equation holds:
rVE = (1  w)! + (VU   VE). (22)
We denote the value function of an unemployed worker as VU and if  is constant, that
is, in an steady state, the following asset value equation holds:
rVU = b0 + q()(VE   VU). (23)
We know that the value function of the rm is
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt
h
F (K;AL)  (1 + F )!L  !V  

_K + K
i
dt
In an steady state _l = 0 and _k = 0 so we have to write the value function in terms of l
and k. Multiplying and dividing by AN we obtain
VF =
Z 1
0
e rtAN
24F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !L
AN
  !
_L+ L
q()AN
 

_K + K

AN
35 dt
we also know that _l
l
=
_L
L
  n that is _L =

_l
l
+ n

L and _k
k
=
_K
K
  n   x that is _K =
_k
k
+ n+ x

K that substituted in VF gives
VF =
Z 1
0
e rtAN
24F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !L
AN
  !

_l
l
+ n+ 

L
q()AN
 

_k
k
+ n+ x+ 

K

AN
35 dt
now making _l = 0 and _k = 0 and considering that A = A0ext and N = N0ent and that
A0 = N0 = 1 we get
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VF =
Z 1
0
e (r (n+x))t

F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !L
AN
   (n+ )!L
q()AN
  (n+ x+ )K
AN

dt
so that means that in the steady state the real discount factor is r  (n+x). Then the
value asset equation implies
(r   (n+ x))VF =

F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !L
AN
   (n+ )!L
q()AN
  (n+ x+ )K
AN

that is
VFLR =
h
F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !LAN    (n+)!Lq()AN   (n+x+)KAN
i
r   (n+ x) (24)
or
VFLR =
h
F (k; l) 
h
(1 + F ) + 
(n+)
q()
i
wl   (n+ x+ ) k
i
r   (n+ x)
Note that in increases in x capitalizes the value of the rm and an increase in r
decapitalizes it because the present value of prots along life is lower. Also we need to
know the value function of a rm of hiring an extra worker V 0F;:, then if the wage is taken
as exogenous we have that the following asset value equation must hold
rV 0F;N = [FL   (1 + F )!]  V 0F;N
that is13
V 0F;N =
FL   (1 + F )!
r + 
(25)
note that we do not take into account the vacancy cost because we assume that at that
point the cost of posting a vacancy has already been paid and hence it doesnt a¤ect wage
bargaining, this is a standard feature of the matching frictions model.
6 The Nash Solution
In this case L, K, and w are decided at the same time or they can be renegotiated at
any time or set without commitment, this means, in particular, that investment is not an
irreversible choice and can be changed at any time. One can show that the same solution
13Solving the dynamic program using the Bellman equation one gets directly this expression from the
he derivative of the envelop condition in the steady state (see Cahuc et al. (2008) equation D.1).
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holds if L is decided rst and later K and w are chosen simultaneously (Cahuc (2014),
5.1.1), this second case is also justied when wages are being bargained simultaneously
with the rm without the possibility of renegotiating employment.
6.1 Individual Wage Setting
When there is individual wage setting each individual worker bargains the wage with the
rm, in this case when deciding the wage the function to maximize is
 ln(VE   VU) + (1  ) ln
 
V 0F;N

(26)
where (VE   VU) is the surplus that a worker gets if hired and V 0F;N is the surplus
that the rm gets if it hires an extra worker. This is the usual surplus sharing rule for
individual wage setting, used normally in models with matching frictions. We substitute
VE   VU using (22)14 that is VE   VU = (1 w)! rVUr+ then the function to maximize is:
 ln(
(1  w)!   rVU
r + 
) + (1  ) ln

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )!
(r + )

(27)
that gives as a rst order condition:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)rVU +

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
Note that the wage setting rule says that the wage depends positively on the marginal
product of labor.
Using (23) we get
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(1  )
(1  w)q()(VE   VU) +

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
Note that the wage setting rule says that the wage depends positively on the unem-
ployment benet.
Calculating (VE   VU) using Ranjan´s method15 (Ranjan Online Appendix Part IV)
we get (see appendix)
(VE   VU) = (1  w)
r + 

1  
(r +   x)
(1 + F ) q()
!
and then the wage equation becomes
14Because the wage is bargained between an employed worker and the rm we substitute VE VU using
only the asset value equation of an employed worker. In the collective wage setting case when a union
represents both employed and unemployed workers we will use both asset value equations.
15This method uses the relationship between VE  VU and V 0F;N obtained in the rst order condition to
obtain an expression that depends on FL and then we substitute FL using the employment equation.
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! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(r +   x)
(1 + F ) (r + )
! +

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
16.
Assuming also that b0 = b!17 , such that b < (1  w) we get :
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b! +
(r +   x)
(1 + F ) (r + )
! +

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
that is 
1  (1  )
(1  w)b 
(r +   x)
(1 + F ) (r + )

! =

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL) (28)
and then the wage equation is
! = m!FL =

(1 + F )
h
1  (1 )
(1 w)b 
(r+ x)
(1+F )(r+)
iFL(K;AL)18
that is the wage is a proportion m! of the marginal product of labor that depends on
, r and x having that an increase in x (decrease in ) reduces the wage. This dependence
of the wage equation on x does not appear neither in Pissarides (1990) nor in Eriksson
(1997) and this the reason why the results obtained in this section are di¤erent from the
ones presented in Erikssons paper.
One can also compute (VE VU) using (22) and (23) which gives (VE VU) = (1 w)! b0r++q()
and then the wage equation becomes (see appendix):
! =
1
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
  (1  w)
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
seeing in a more clearly way that an increase in x produces wage moderation. This
is because an increase in x increases the long run r =  + x decreasing (VE   VU) and
then the wage. Pissarides (1990) does not show this e¤ect because the long run interest
is derived using a IS-LM model and not the innite horizon model.
The employment equation is given by (10), that is
FL = !

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

(29)
substituting (29) in (28) FL and ! cancel and one gets the "equilibrium" labor market
equation19, that is, the employment equation when the wage setting equation is taken into
17One can use di¤erent ways for determining b0, for example that the goverment has a balanced budget
that is b0(N   L) = (w + F )!L, or b0 = by. We will use this simple method when it works.
19The equilibrium labor market equation says that m! times
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account, that is:

1  (1  )
(1  w)b 
(r +   x)
(1 + F ) (r + )

=

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

(30)
Note that this equation holds for any neoclassical production function and that depends
only on r and  (not on k^ because FL cancels). That is with this specic wage equation r
is given by the Euler equation (14), k^ (and then y^ = f(k^), that is labor productivity) is
given by the capital demand equation (15),  is given by the employment and the wage
setting equation once one substitutes only r (not k^) in (30), l by the equilibrium of
labor market ows equation (19), k by the capital per e¢ cient labor equation (20) and
c by the capital accumulation equation (21).
In order to derive the e¤ect of x on  substitute r = + x in (30) to get

1  (1  )
(1  w)b 
(%+ + (   1)x)
(1 + F ) (%+ + x)

=

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(%+ + (   1)x)
q()

(31)
And then an equilibrium in the labor market always exists and there exists  > 1
such that if  >  then d

dx
< 0 and then dl

dx
< 0, if  =  then d

dx
= 0 and then dl

dx
= 0
and if  < then d

dx
> 0 and then dl

dx
> 0 (see appendix).
Note that this result modies Eriksson´s (1997) result because he obtains that if  > 1
(<) then d

dx
< (>)0 and then dl

dx
< (>)0. This is due to the fact that the ad hoc wage
equation that he assumes is not the one that results from the usual surplus sharing rule
that produces that x a¤ects also the wage equation.
The intuition for the result is the following: on the one hand an increase in x increases
the long run interest rate and then reduces the mark up and the wage, on the other long run
labor turnover costs depend on r x = %++( 1)x having that if  < 1 and increase in x
reduces turn over costs. Because total labor costs are given by ! [(1 + F ) + turnover costs]
if both decrease then rms open more vacancies increasing  and employment. But even
for a "small"  > 1 the increase now of the turnover cost is compensated by the the
decrease of the wage increasing employment. Only if  is high enough total labor cost
increases reducing employment.
Finally, if the government has a balanced budget constraint, that is, b0(1  l) = (w +
F )!l and if w = 'F , as shown in the appendix, the tax rates are given by
1 + F = 1 +
b
(1 + ')
+ n
q()
1  w = 1  'b
(1 + ')
+ n
q()
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which means that now the equation that determines , (31) becomes more complicated,
but as long as the e¤ect of changing  does not a¤ect the slopes of the two sides of the
equation the e¤ect of x on  is going to be the same, because the tax rates do not depend
on x.
6.2 Collective Wage Setting
When there is collective wage setting we assume that a union that represents both em-
ployed and unemployed workers bargains the wage with the rm. In this case the function
to maximize is20
 ln

L
N
(VE   VU) + (N   L)
N
N

  VU

N

+ (1  ) ln (SF ) (32)
where

L
N
(VE   VU) + (N L)N N

is the expected value function of a worker and then
L
N
(VE   VU) + (N L)N N

  VU is the expected surplus of a worker. On the other hand
SF is the surplus that the rm gets when employing L workers.
Alternatively one may consider that in the collective bargaining a union that repre-
sents only employed workers bargains the wage with the rm, in this case the function to
maximize is21
 ln [(VE   VU)L] + (1  ) ln (SF ) (33)
Note that operating (32) gives also (33). The wage equation comes from maximizing
(33) with respect to !. Substituting VE   VU from (22) and (23) as in Ranjan (2013)
22 we obtain VE   VU = ! b0r++q()and SF , the surplus of the rm in the steady state of
employing all workers, is obtained deducting to (24) the cost of open a vacancy but not
the cost of capital because we assume that investment is not an irreversible choice and if
the rm does not employ the workers it invests nothing23. The objective function is:
 ln

(1  w)!   b0
r + + q()

L

+ (1  ) ln
0@
h
F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !LAN   (n+x+)KAN
i
r   (n+ x)
1A (34)
20This is the extension of the function proposed by Ranjan (2013) when the wage is negotiated.
21This is the function proposed by Ebell and Haefke (2006).
22The di¤erence with the case in which the union cares only about employed workers is that in this case
one computes VE   VU only using (22).
23See for example Cahuc et al (2014) p. 447 or Anderson and Devereux (1988). If one wants to substract
the cost of capital to the rm surplus one must asume that people that negotiates the wage think that
investment is irreversible which is not the case. This may be justied when the wage is negotiated by the
human resource department of the rm and investment decided by the nancial department.
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that gives the wage equation (see appendix):
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +

(1 + F )

F (K;AL)
L
  (n+  + x)K
L

Note that the wage setting rule says that the wage depends positively on the unem-
ployment benet and the average product of labor (labor productivity). Assuming also
that b0 = b! the wage equation becomes:
! =
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )

F (K;AL)
L
  (n+  + x)K
L

(35)
Having now that the wage depends on labor productivity and also depends negatively
on x. Again the employment equation is given by:
FL = !

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

(36)
and substituting (35) in (36) one gets
FL =
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )

F (K;AL)
L
  (n+  + x)K
L
 
(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

that is
FLh
F (K;AL)
L
  (n+  + x)K
L
i = f(k^)  k^f 0(k^)
f(k^)  (n+  + x)k^ =
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

(37)
that means that in this case, the employment and the wage equation given r and k^
gives . Now to analyze the e¤ect of x on  becomes more complicated because we have to
take into account the indirect e¤ect of x on k^. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas
(K(AL)1 ) it turns out that f(k^) = k^ in which case the "equilibrium" labor market
equation becomes
(1  )
1  (n+  + x)k^1 
[(1  w)  (1  )b]
(1  w) =

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

(38)
That is, with this specic wage equation and a Cobb-Douglas production function r
is given by the Euler equation (14), k^ (and then y^ = f(k^), that is labor productivity)
is given by the capital demand equation (15),  is given by the employment and the
wage setting equation once one substitutes r and k^in (38), l by the equilibrium of labor
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market ows equation (19), k by the capital per e¢ cient labor equation (20) and c by
the capital accumulation equation (21). In order to analyze the e¤ect of x on employment:
substitute k^1  = 
r+
and r = + x in (38) to get:
(1  )
1   (n++x)
++x
[(1  w)  (1  )b]
(1  w) =

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(%+ + (   1)x)
q()

(39)
And then if  < ~ an equilibrium in the labor market exists and there exists ^ > 1 such
that if  > ^ then d

dx
< 0 and then dl

dx
< 0, if  = ^ then d

dx
= 0 and then dl

dx
= 0 and
if  < ^ then d

dx
> 0 and then dl

dx
> 0 (see appendix). The intuition for the result is the
same that the one presented with individual wage setting: and increase in x decreases the
wage and labor turnover costs when  < 1. Then in the Nash situation, with individual
or collective wage setting if  5 1 growth is good for employment and in both case there
exists a value of  > 1 where for a higher  growth is bad for employment.
7 The Firm as the Stackelberg Leader (the "Stole and
Zwiebel" Case)
We now analyze the case when the rm acts as a Stackelberg leader having that K and L
are decided rst and the wage is negotiated later24 orK and L are set with commitment (K
is irreversible) and the wage is negotiated without commitment. Now the wage equation
depends on L and K that is ! = ~!(L;K) and the rm takes strategic advantage of this
relation when setting K25 and L. In this case the rm maximizes
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt
"
F (K;AL)  (1 + F ) ~!(L;K)L  ~!(L;K)
_L+ L
q()
 

_K + K
#
dt
And the rst order conditions26 are the sz (Stole and Zwiebel) capital demand equation:
FK   L @~!
@K
= r + 
and the sz employment equation is:
24This is the case presented in Cahuc et al (2008), without technological progress. As we said before
in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) it is argued that the case where L is decided rst and K and the wage
negotiated later is equivalent to the Nash situation.
25In the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) paper there is no capital.
26These are presented in Cahuc et al (2008).
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FL = (1 + F )! + (1 + F )L
@~!
@L
+ 
(r + + q
0() _
q()
)
q()
!   L
@~!
@L
_L
L
q()
="
(1 + F )  
q()
_L
L
#
L
@~!
@L
+
24(1 + F ) +  (r + + q0()q() _ )
q()
35! (40)
where, due to its endogeneity, _!
!
has disappeared from the expression in the turnover
costs depending now only on r and not on r   _!
!
as in the Nash case.
In terms of k^ and l the sz capital demand is:
f 0

k^

= r +  + L
@~!
@K
(41)
and the sz employment equation:
f(k^) k^f 0

k^

=
1
A
"
(1 + F )  
q()
 
_l
l
+ n
!#
L
@~!
@L
+
24(1 + F ) +  (r + + q0()q() _ )
q()
35w
(42)
and in the steady state the sz employment equation is:
FL =

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

(43)
Note that now x only appears a¤ecting indirectly r (= + x) and that an increase in
x increases the turnover costs. The sz employment equation in terms of k^ is:
f(k^)  k^f 0

k^

=
1
A

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ w

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

: (44)
In this case the surplus of hiring an extra worker is given by
rV 0F;SZ =

FL   (1 + F )

! + L
@~!(L;K)
@L

  V 0F;SZ
that is:
V 0F;SZ =
h
FL   (1 + F )
h
! + L@~!(L;K)
@L
ii
r + 
(45)
7.1 Individual Wage Setting
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) were the rst to consider that the rm may take into account
the wage equation when deciding employment. As pointed out by them, as Ranjan (2012)
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in P. 6, says: "this results in overhiring by the rm because it recognizes that hiring an
extraworker will reduce the marginal product of each worker and therefore, reduce the
wage the rm will pay to each worker." Now the maximizing function for setting the wage
is:
 ln(
(1  w)!   rVU
r + 
) + (1  ) ln
 
FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )

! + L@~!
@L

(r + )
!
In this case the wage equation is (see appendix):
! =
(1  )
(1  w)rVU +

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

.
Using (23) we get
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(1  )
(1  w)q()(VE   VU) +

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

.
Calculating (VE   VU) using Ranjan method we get (see appendix)
(VE   VU) = (1  w)
r + 

1  
"
(r + )!   nL@~!
@L
(1 + F ) q()
#
and then the wage equation is
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
!
(1 + F )
+

(1 + F )

FL  

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

L
@~!
@L

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And assuming b0 = b! the wage equation becomes

1  (1  )b
(1  w)  

(1 + F )

! =

(1 + F )

FL  

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

L
@~!
@L

that is:
! =
1h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i 
(1 + F )

FL  

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

L
@~!
@L

that if the production is Cobb-Douglas (F (K;L) = A1 KL1 ) gives the solution
(see appendix):
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! =
(1  )A1 KL 
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
 (46)
and note that again the wage is a proportion of FL = (1   )A1 KL  and that
an increase in r ( + x in the long run) reduces the wage28. Knowing the wage one can
compute:
L
@~!
@K
=
(1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
A1 K 1L1  (47)
and
L
@~!
@L
=
 (1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
A1 KL . (48)
Note that L @~!
@K
= ! L
K
and L@~!
@L
=  !. Then the sz capital demand equation (41)
becomes:24  (1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+) n
(r+)

35 k^ 1 = r +  (49)
expression that, as noted by Cahuc et al. (2008), incorporates the hold up e¤ect and
the Stole and Zwiebel overemployment e¤ect.
The employment equation given by (43) when the production function is Cobb- Douglas
becomes:
(1  )A1 KL  = FL =

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

(50)
and substituting (46) and (48) in (50) the sz "equilibrium" labor market equation is:
1  (1  )b
(1  w)  

(1 + F )

1 +
n
(r + )

 =

(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (r + (1 + n))
q()

(51)
Note that this equation holds only for the Cobb-Douglas production function and that
depends only on r and  (not on k^). That is with this specic wage equation r is given
by the Euler equation (14), k^ (and then y^ = f(k^), that is labor productivity) is given
28The same relationships are obtained if one substitutes (VE VU ) by the equality VE VU = ! b0r++q()
(see appendix).
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by the sz capital demand equation (49),  is given by the sz employment and the wage
setting equation once one substitutes only r(not k^) in (51), l by the equilibrium of labor
market ows equation (19), k by the capital per e¢ cient labor equation (20) and c by
the capital accumulation equation (21). In order to analyze the e¤ect of x on employment:
substitute r = + x in (51) to get
1  (1  )b
(1  w)     

(1 + F )

1 +
n
(+ x+ )

 =

(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

(52)
And then an equilibrium in the labor market always exists and there exists  such that
if  >  then d

dx
< 0 and then dl

dx
< 0, if  =  then d

dx
= 0 and then dl

dx
= 0 and if
 <  then d

dx
> 0 and then dl

dx
> 0 (see appendix). The intuition for the result is easy to
see looking at the employment equation when one substitutes L@~!
@L
by  ! in (50) having
FL = !

(1  ) (1 + F ) + n
q()
+ 
(+ + x)
q()

,
on the one hand an increase in x increases turnover costs by x and reduces the wage
! then if  is high enough the increase of turnover costs is greater the reduction of the
wage and the the rm opens less vacancies having more unemployment.
7.2 Collective Wage Setting
Now, because capital is irreversible, the objective function to maximize when deciding
wages is:
 ln

(1  w)!   b0
(r + + q())

L

+ (1  ) ln
0@
h
F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !LAN
i
r   (n+ x)
1A
where the surplus of the rm SF in the steady state of employing all workers, is obtained
deducting to (24) the cost of open a vacancy and the cost of capital because now investment
is irreversible. The solution of the gives the wage equation:
! = ~!(K;L) =
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )
F (K;AL)
L
,
where the wage set is a proportion of the average product of labor, that is, labor
productivity but not on the interest rate. With the Cobb-Douglas production function
the wage equation becomes:
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! = ~!(K;L) =
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )
A1 KL , (53)
and then
L
@~!
@K
=
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )
A1 K 1L1 . (54)
L
@~!
@L
=
 (1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )
A1 KL . (55)
Where again L@~!
@L
=  !. Then the sz capital demand equation is given by
  (1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )

k^ 1 = r +  (56)
that shows the hold up and the overemployment e¤ect. The sz employment equation
is given by:
(1  )A1 KL  =

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

(57)
and substituting (53) and (55) in (57)we get (see appendix) the "equilibrium" labor
market equation:
(1  )

1  (1  )b
(1  w)

=

(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (r + (1 + n))
q()

(58)
Note that this equation holds only for the Cobb-Douglas production function and that
depends only on r and  (not on k^).
That is with this specic wage equation r is given by the Euler equation (14), k^ (and
then y^ = f(k^), that is labor productivity) is given by the sz capital demand equation
(56),  is given by the sz employment and the wage setting equation once one substitutes
only r (not k^) in (58), l by the equilibrium of labor market ows equation (19), k by
the capital per e¢ cient labor equation (20) and c by the capital accumulation equation
(21). In order to analyze the e¤ect of x on employment: substitute r = + x in (58) to
get:
(1  )

1  (1  )b
(1  w)

=

(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

(59)
And then an equilibrium always exists and d

dx
< 0 and then dl

dx
< 0 (see appendix).
The intuition of the result is easy to see is writing again the employment equation as
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FL = !

(1  ) (1 + F ) + n
q()
+ 
(+ + x)
q()

:
As in the individual wage setting case and increases in x increases turnover cost but
now does not decrease the wage meaning that the rm unambiguously opens less vacancies
and there is more unemployment.
8 Setting the Wage Using the Employment Function
In this section we assume that the wage is decided rst and then the rm decides K and
L simultaneously. This means that in the wage bargaining it is known the capital demand
equation:
FK = (r + ),
that does not depend on !, and the employment equation:
FL = !

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

,
that when the production function is Cobb-Douglas one can solve for employment,
obtaining:
L = ~L(!) =
24 !A
h
(1 + F ) + 
(r+ x)
q()
i
(1  )
35 
1

K
A
, (60)
or
l =
24 1  
!
A
h
(1 + F ) + 
(r+ x)
q()
i
35 1 k.
8.1 Individual Wage Setting
In this case the wage is set in order to maximize, as usual:
 ln(
!   rVU
r + 
) + (1  ) ln

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )!
(r + )

subject to (16), that gives:
 ln(
!   rVU
r + 
) + (1  ) ln
 
 (r+ x)
q()
!
(r + )
!
in which case it is obvious that the wage set is going to be innite wage because raising
the wage increases the surplus of an employed worker and the value function for the rm
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of hiring an extra worker. Galí (1995) presents a more complicated case, where instead of
having ! in the surplus function of an individual employed worker he introduces his utility
function U(C;L), having that when the individual sets unilaterally the wage,  = 1, and
the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then the wage set by the individual is a mark
up, that depends on the elasticity of the employment function, over the marginal rate of
substitution.
8.2 Collective Wage Setting: the Union Monopoly Model
In this case the program for setting the wage is to choose ! in order to maximize
 ln

(1  w)!   b0
r(r + + q())

L

+ (1  ) ln
0@
h
F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !LAN   (n+x+)KAN
i
r   (n+ x)
1A
subject to the capital demand and the employment equation. It is di¢ cult to nd and
explicit solution for the wage in this case. Then, as in Ranjan (2012), we consider the limit
case of the union monopoly model where the union sets the wage unilaterally, in which
case the program is to choose ! in order to maximize
(1  w)!   b0
r(r + + q())

~L(!)

Then one gets the wage equation (see appendix) 29:
! =
1
(1  w)(1  )b0 (61)
In this case the wage is a mark-up over the unemployment benet and one can check
that this is the same wage equation that one gets in a model "without frictions"30. Note
that the wage equation does no depend on the matching function q() nor onK, the reason
is that the wage set depends on the elasticity of the employment equation and, when the
production function is Cobb-Douglas and 0 = !, the elasticity of the employment
equation is constant and equal to 1

with or without frictions.31 Now, because we are
in a growth model, we have to endogenize b0, the problem is that we can not use the
assumption b0 = b! as we have done so far. The reason is that (61) becomes:
29The other more general way to proceed is to consider that when setting the wage agents think that
investement is irreversible, depending, then, the function to maximize only on quasi rents F (K;AL)AN  
(1 + F )
!L
AN in which case one gets the more general wage equation ! =
1
(1 w)


(1 ) + (1  )

b0.
30Correctly speaking in the model where the cost of open a vacancy is zero ( = 0).
31This was shown in Garcia and Sorolla (2013) when matches last for one period that is  = 1. Here
this result is generalized for any 0 <  < 1.
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! =
1
(1  w)(1  )b!,
that is:
1 =
1
(1  w)(1  )b,
meaning that only with this combination of parameters the wage equation and this
way of setting the unemployment benets are compatible for any wage ! set.
The "natural" alternative assumption to make is that the government increases the
unemployment benet with time, having that b0 = bA in which case (61) becomes:
! =
b
(1  w)(1  )A,
that is,
w =
b
(1  w)(1  ) . (62)
The substitution of the wage equation into the employment equation (60) gives the
"equilibrium" labor market equation:
L =

b
(1  w)

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()
  1
 K
A
that is
k^ =

b
(1  w)

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()
 1

(63)
That is with this specic wage equation r is given by the Euler equation (14), k^ (and
then y^ = f(k^), that is labor productivity) is given by the capital demand equation (15),
 is given by the employment and the wage setting equation once one substitutes r and
k^ in (63), l by the equilibrium of labor market ows equation (19), k by the capital per
e¢ cient labor equation (20) and c by the capital accumulation equation (21). In order to
analyze the e¤ect of x on employment: one has to compute k^ using the capital demand
equation, substitute it in (63) and consider that r = + x getting:

(+  + x)
 
1 
=
b
(1  w)

(1 + F ) + 
(+ + (   1)x)
q()

And then if b < ~b an equilibrium always exists and there exists ~ < 1 such that if
 > ~ then d

dx
< 0 and then dl

dx
< 0, if  = ~ then d

dx
= 0 and then dl

dx
= 0 and if
 < ~ then d

dx
> 0 and then dl

dx
> 0 (see appendix). The intuition now is that an increase
in x increases the wage (because A(t) = ext is higher), on the other hand, if  > 1 it
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also increases the turnover cost having less employment, but if  < 1 and increase in x
decreases the turnover cost, if this decrease is high (small ) the total e¤ect on labor costs
is negative opening more vacancies.
Alternatively, one can assume that the government sets the unemployment benet in
order to have a balanced budget that is b0(1   l) = (w + F )!l and that w = 'F in
which case one gets that the governments budget constraint is:
b0 = (w + F )
!l
1  l = (1 + ') F
!l
1  l
and the wage equation (61) becomes:
! =
1
(1  'F )(1  ) (1 + ') F
!l
1  l ,
solving for the employment rate one gets:
l =
1h
1 + (1+')F
(1 'F )(1 )
i
which means that the wage equation adding the specic way of nancing the unemployment
benet determines the equilibrium amount of employment32.
That is with this specic wage equation r is given by the Euler equation (14), k^ (and
then y^ = f(k^), that is labor productivity) is given by the capital demand equation (15),
l is given by the wage setting equation (61),  is given by the labor market ows equation
(19), k by the capital per e¢ cient labor equation (20) and c by the capital accumulation
equation (21), the employment equation (16) gives the wage.
Note that in this case the long run employment rate does not depend on x that is
dl
dx
= 0 for any value of  because employment is given by the wage equation that does
not depend on x. So that means that there is no long run relationship between growth
and unemployment. This is the same result that appears in Raurich and Sorolla (2014),
where there are no frictions in the labor market and the wage is set using an e¢ ciency
wage model.
9 Conclusions
We conclude saying that in general the di¤erent timing for setting the wage, capital and
labor, the type of wage setting: individual or collective and how the unemployment is
nanced, that is, di¤erent labor market institutions change the long run e¤ect of exoge-
32A similar result is obtained if one does b0 = y, as in Daveri and Tabellini (2000), having l =
(1 w)
( (1 )+(1 ))
:
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nous labor productivity growth, x; on employment. The reason is that the specic timing,
the type of wage negotiation and the way of nancing the unemployment benet changes
how the rate of growth a¤ects the wage and turnover costs and then, total labor costs
a¤ecting vacancies and employment. The following table summarizes for each labor mar-
ket institution the e¤ect of x on the wage and the turnover cost and the nal e¤ect on
employment.
One can see that, depending on the labor market institution, the e¤ect of x on wages
can be negative, zero or positive and that the e¤ect on turnover costs positive or negative.
However one obtains that for a higher constant relative risk aversion parameter of the
individual utility function () the e¤ect of growth on employment is negative for all labor
market institutions but one (the case of the union monopoly model when the government
adjusts taxes for balancing its budget). This is because, for a higher , an increase in x
implies a high increase in turnover costs via the long run interest rate (r = + x in the
long run, where  is the individual discount rate), that can not be o¤set by the negative
e¤ect of x on wages that occurs with some labor market institutions. Moreover we also
have that for a lower  the e¤ect of growth on employment is positive for all labor market
institutions but two (the Stole and Zwiebel case with collective wage setting and the case
of the union monopoly model when the government adjusts taxes for balancing its budget)
because in this cases the reduction of wages o¤sets the increases in turnover costs.
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Appendix
This appendix presents the detailed (step by step) proofs of all the results presented
in the text.
1.1) Computation of the Nash bargaining wage equation when there is
individual wage setting:
The program is to choose ! in order to maximize:
 ln(
(1  w)!   rVU
r + 
) + (1  ) ln

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )!
(r + )

,
that gives as a rst order condition:

(1  w)
((1  w)!   rVU) = (1  )
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )! ,
that is:
 (1  w) (FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )!) = (1  ) (1 + F ) ((1  w)!   rVU), (64)
and then:
 (1  w)FL(K;AL)   (1  w) (1 + F )! = (1  ) (1 + F ) ((1  w)!   rVU)
or:
 (1  w)FL(K;AL) = (1 ) (1  w) (1 + F )! (1 ) (1 + F ) rVU+ (1  w) (1+F )!
that is:
(1 + F ) (1  w)! =  (1  w)FL(K;AL) + (1  ) (1 + F ) rVU
and nally:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)rVU +

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL).
Using (23) we get:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(1  )
(1  w)q()(VE   VU) +

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL).
1.2) Calculation of (VE VU) following Ranjans method (using the employ-
ment equation).
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Using (22) we get
(VE   VU) = 1
r + 
((1  w)!   rVU) ,
that is,
(r + )(VE   VU) = ((1  w)!   rVU) ,
then we can rewrite (64) as:
 (1  w) (FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )!) = (1  ) (1 + F ) (r + )(VE   VU),
that is:
(VE   VU) = (1  w)
r + 

1  
FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )!
(1 + F )
=
(1  w)
r + 

1  

FL(K;AL)
(1 + F )
  !

Now using the employment equation (16):
FL =

(1 + F ) + 
(r +   x)
q()

!
we substitute FL getting:
(VE   VU) = (1  w)
r + 

1  
24
h
(1 + F ) + 
(r+ x)
q()
i
!
(1 + F )
  !
35 = (1  w)
r + 

1  

[(1 + F ) q() + (r +   x)]!
(1 + F ) q()
  !

=
(1  w)
r + 

1  

[(1 + F ) q() + (r +   x)]
(1 + F ) q()
  1

! =
(1  w)
r + 

1  

(r +   x)
(1 + F ) q()

!.
1.3) Computation of the Nash bargaining wage equation when there is in-
dividual wage wetting computing (VE   VU) using (22) and (23).
Using (22) and (23) one gets:
(VE   VU) =

(1  w)!   b0
(r + + q())

and then the wage equation becomes:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(1  )
(1  w)q()

(1  w)!   b0
(r + + q())

+

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
assuming b0 = b! one gets:
! =
(1  )b!
(1  w) +
(1  )
(1  w)q()

((1  w)  b)!
(r + + q())

+

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
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that is:

1  (1  )b
(1  w)  
(1  )
(1  w)q()

((1  w)  b)
(r + + q())

! =

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
or:

(1  w)
(1  w)  
(1  )b
(1  w)  
(1  )
(1  w)q()

((1  w)  b)
(r + + q())

! =

(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
that is:

(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )q()

((1  w)  b)
(r + + q())

! =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
and simplifying:
"
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )
 
((1  w)  b)
( r+
q()
+ 1)
!#
! =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
in which case the wage equation becomes:
! =
1
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
  (1  w)
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
1.4) Existence of the Nash Equilibrium when there is individual wage set-
ting.
The equilibrium labor market equation is:
1  (1  )
(1  w)b 
(%+ + (   1)x)
(1 + F ) (%+ + x)

=

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(%+ + (   1)x)
q()

or
(1  w) (1 )b (1  w)

(%+ + (   1)x)
(%+ + x) (1 + F )

=
 (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(+ + (   1)x)
q()

that is
(1  w) (1 )b (1  w)
(1 + F )


(%+ + (   1)x)
(%+ + x)

 =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(+ + (   1)x)
q()

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then the left hand side is equal to (1  w)  (1  )b (> 0 when b < (1  w)) when
 = 0 and is decreasing with . The right hand side is equal to  (1  w)when  = 0
(lower than (1  w)   (1   )b if b < (1  w)) and is increasing with  and then both
lines intersect for a positive .
1.5) Calculation of @
@x
and .
From the equilibrium labor market equation we have:
G(; x) = (1  w) (1 )b (1  w)
(1 + F )


(%+ + (   1)x)
(%+ + x)

 (1  w)
(1 + F )


(1 + F ) + 
(%+ + (   1)x)
q()

= 0
then, by the implicit function theorem:
@
@x
=  
dG
dx
dG
d
=  
(1 w)
(1+F )
(%+)
(%++x)2
  (1 w)
(1+F )
 ( 1)
q()
  (1  w) (%++( 1)x)(%++x)(1+F ) +
(1 w)
(1+F )
 (%++( 1)x)q
0()
(q())2
Note that q0() < 0 and then the denominator is negative (remember that from the
program of the family + (   1)x > 0) and then positive with the minus sign, so @
@x
> 0
if
(1  w) 
(1 + F )
(%+ )
(%+ + x)2
>
(1  w)
(1 + F )

(   1)
q()

(%+ )
(%+ + x)2
>
(   1)
q()
Note that if  5 1 then  (%+)
(%++x)2
> ( 1)
q()
and then @
@x
> 0. Therefore  > 1 is given
by:
(   1) (%+ + x)2 = q()(%+ ).
1.6) Derivation of the tax rates with a balanced budget constraint:
We have that a balanced budget constraint means:
b0(1  l) = (w + F )!l
and if b0 = b! then
b(1  l) = (w + F )l
that is
(w + F ) =
1  l
l
b
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and if w = 'F
F =
1  l
l
b
(1 + ')
and then:
w =
1  l
l
'b
(1 + ')
=

1
l
  1

'b
(1 + ')
.
On the other hand the equilibrium labor market ows equation is:
l =
"
1
1 + +n
q()
#
or: 
1
l
  1

=
+ n
q()
And then:
F =
b
(1 + ')
+ n
q()
that is:
1 + F = 1 +
b
(1 + ')
+ n
q()
and
w =
'b
(1 + ')
+ n
q()
that is:
1  w = 1  'b
(1 + ')
+ n
q()
2.1) Computation of the Nash bargaining wage equation when there is col-
lective wage setting:
The program is to choose ! in order to maximize:
 ln

(1  w)!   b0
(r + + q()

L

+ (1  ) ln
0@
h
F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !LAN   (n+  + x) KAN
i
r   (n+ x)
1A
that gives as rst order condition:
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(1  w)
((1  w)!   b0) = (1  )
(1 + F )L
[F (K;AL)  [(1 + F )]!L  (n+  + x)K]
that is:

(1  w) [F (K;AL)  [(1 + F )]!L  (n+  + x)K]
(1 + F )L
= (1  )((1  w)!   b0)
and then:

(1  w)
(1 + F )
[F (K;AL)  (n+  + x)K]
L
  (1  w)! = (1  )(!   b0)
or:
(1  w)!   (1  )b0) =  (1  w)
(1 + F )

F (K;AL)
L
  (n+  + x)K
L

that is:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +

(1 + F )

F (K;AL)
L
  (n+  + x)K
L

2.2) Existence of the Nash Equilibrium when there is Collective Wage Set-
ting:
The equilibrium labor market equation is
[(1  w)  (1  )b]
(1  w)
(1  )
1   (n++x)
++x
=

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(%+ + (   1)x)
q()

or
[(1  w)  (1  )b] (1  )
1   (n++x)
++x
= 
(1  w)
(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(%+ + (   1)x)
q()

The left hand side is constant and positive when b < (1 w) and  > (1 )x+n. The
right hand side is equal to  (1  w)when  = 0 (lower than [(1  w)  (1  )b] (1 )
1  (n++x)
++x
when  < ~ = (1 w) (1 )b (1 w)
(1 w) (1 )b  (n++x)++x (1 w)
< 1) and is increasing with  and then both
lines intersect for a positive .
2.3) Calculation of @
@x
and ^. From the equilibrium labor market equation we have
G(; x) = [(1  w)  (1  )b] (1  )
1   (n++x)
++x
  (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(%+ + (   1)x)
q()

= 0
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then, by the implicit function theorem
@
@x
=  
dG
dx
dG
d
=  
[(1  w)  (1  )b]
(1 )

( n+(1 )
(++x)2

[1  (n++x)++x ]
2    (1 w)(1+F )
( 1)
q()
(1 w)
(1+F )
 (%++( 1)x)q
0()
(q())2
Note that q0() < 0 and then the denominator is negative and then positive with the
minus sign then @
@x
> 0 if :
[(1  w)  (1  )b]
 (1  )

( n ( 1)
(++x)2

h
1   (n++x)
++x
i2    (1  w)(1 + F ) (   1)q() > 0
Now the term    n   (   1) > 0 if  < +
n+
=  > 1 because % > n. Then
if  5 1 we have that [(1  w)  (1  )b] (1 )+x++(n++x)
[1 (n++x) +x+ ]
2    (1 w)(1+F )
( 1)
q()
> 0 and
then @
@x
> 0.
If  >  > 1 then [(1  w)  (1  )b] (1 )+x++(n++x)
[1 (n++x) +x+ ]
2    (1 w)(1+F )
( 1)
q()
< 0 and
then @
@x
< 0. And nally there exists 1 < ^ <  such that
[(1  w)  (1  )b]
 (1  )

( ^n (^ 1)
(++^x)2

h
1   (n++x)
++^x
i2 =  (1  w)(1 + F ) (^   1)q() .
3.1) Computation of the Stole and Zwiebel wage equation when there is
individual wage setting.
The program is choose ! in order to maximize:
 ln(
(1  w)!   rVU
r + 
) + (1  ) ln
 
FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!@L   (1 + F )!
(r + )
!
that gives as a rst order condition:

(1  w)
((1  w)!   rVU) = (1  )
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!@L   (1 + F )!
, (65)
that is,
 (1  w)

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!
@L
  (1 + F )!

= (1 ) (1 + F ) ((1  w)! rVU)
and then:
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 (1  w)

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!
@L

  (1  w) (1 + F )! = (1 ) (1 + F ) ((1  w)! rVU)
or:
 (1  w)

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!
@L

= (1 ) (1  w) (1 + F )! (1 ) (1 + F ) rVU+ (1  w) (1+F )!
that is:
(1 + F ) (1  w)! =  (1  w)

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!
@L

+ (1  ) (1 + F ) rVU
and solving for ! :
! =
(1  )
(1  w)rVU +

(1 + F )

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!
@L

using (23) we get:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(1  )
(1  w)q()(VE   VU) +

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

3.2) Calculation of (VE VU) following Ranjans method (using the employ-
ment equation) and derivation of the wage equation substituting (VE   VU).
Using (22) we get:
(VE   VU) = 1
r + 
((1  w)!   rVU)
that is:
(r + ) (VE   VU) = (1  w)!   rVU
Then we can write (65) as

(1  w)
(r + ) (VE   VU) = (1  )
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!@L
  (1 + F )!
that is
(VE VU) = (1  w)
r + 

1  

FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!@L
  (1 + F )!
(1 + F )
=
(1  w)
r + 

1  
"
FL(K;AL)  (1 + F )L@~!@L

(1 + F )
  !
#
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and then using (43), one gets:
FL =

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

that is:
FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L
=

 n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

that substituted in (VE   VU) gives:
(VE VU) = (1  w)
r + 

1  
24
h
 n
q()
i
L@~!
@L
+ !
h
(1 + F ) + 
(r+)
q()
i
(1 + F )
  !
35 = (1  w)
r + 

1  
24
h
 n
q()
i
L@~!
@L
+ ! (r+)
q()
(1 + F )
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that is
(VE   VU) = (1  w)
r + 

1  
"
(r + )!   nL@~!
@L
(1 + F ) q()
#
substituting (VE   VU) in the wage equation:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(1  )
(1  w)q()(VE   VU) +

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

one obtains:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0+
(1  )
(1  w)q()
(1  w)
r + 

1  
"
(r + )!   nL@~!
@L
(1 + F ) q()
#
+

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

that is:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +

r + 
"
(r + )!   nL@~!
@L
(1 + F )
#
+

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

and:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
!
(1 + F )
 
"
nL@~!
@L
(r + ) (1 + F )
#
+

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

and:
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! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
!
(1 + F )
+

(1 + F )
FL  

 +
n
(r + ) (1 + F )

L
@~!
@L
and:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
!
(1 + F )
+

(1 + F )
FL  



1 +
n
(r + ) (1 + F )

L
@~!
@L
and nally:
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
!
(1 + F )
+

(1 + F )

FL  

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

L
@~!
@L

Assuming that b0 = b! and solving for ! one gets:
! =
1h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i 
(1 + F )

FL  

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

L
@~!
@L

We can write this equation as:
! = a

FL   bL@~!
@L

that is:
! = ab

1
b
FL   L@~!
@L

and if the production function is Cobb-Douglas one can check that the solution is:
! = a
(1  )A1 KL 
(1  ab)
substituting a and b one gets:
! =

(1 + F )
h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i (1  )A1 KL "
1   
(1+F )

1  (1 )b
(1 w) 

(1+F )
  (1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
#
and simplifying the wage equation is
! =
(1  )A1 KL 
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)

40
and note that again the wage is a mark up on FL = (1   )A1 KL  and that an
increase in r reduces the wage because (1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
= (1 + F ) +
n
(r+)
decreases.
3.3 Computation of the Stole and Zwiebel wage equation when there is
individual wage setting computing (VE   VU) using (22) and (23).
We know that:
(VE   VU) =

(1  w)!   b0
(r + + q())

and substituting (VE   VU) in the wage equation
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +
(1  )
(1  w)q()

(1  w)!   b0
(r + + q())

+

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

assuming b0 = b! one gets
! =
(1  )b!
(1  w) +
(1  )
(1  w)q()

((1  w)  b)!
(r + + q())

+

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

that is

1  (1  )b
(1  w)  
(1  )
(1  w)q()

((1  w)  b)
(r + + q())

! =

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

or

(1  w)
(1  w)  
(1  )b
(1  w)  
(1  )
(1  w)q()

((1  w)  b)
(r + + q())

! =

(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

and

(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )q()

((1  w)  b)
(r + + q())

! =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

and
"
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )
 
((1  w)  b)
( r+
q()
+ 1)
!#
! =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

in which case the wage equation becomes:
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! =
1
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
  (1  w)
(1 + F )

FL   (1 + F )L@~!
@L

and then the solution is:
! =
1
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
  (1  w)
(1 + F )
(1  )A1 KL 
(1   1"
(1 w) (1 )b (1 )
 
((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
!# (1 w)
(1+F )
(1 + F ))
that is:
! =
1
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
  (1  w)
(1 + F )
(1  )A1 KL 0B@
"
(1 w) (1 )b (1 )
 
((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
!#
 (1 w)"
(1 w) (1 )b (1 )
 
((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)
!#
1CA
and then:
! =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )
(1  )A1 KL 
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)

   (1  w)

or
! =
1
(1+F )
(1 w)
(1  )A1 KL 
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)

   (1  w)

or
! =
(1  )A1 KL 
(1+F )
(1 w)

(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)

   (1 + F )

having nally:
! =
(1  )A1 KL 
(1+F )


1  (1 )b
(1 w)  
(1 )
(1 w)

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)

   (1 + F )

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and then again an increase in r diminishes the wage.
We can compare it with the one obtained in the Nash equilibrium that is:
! =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )
FL(K;AL)
(1  w)  (1  )b  (1  )

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)

that is
! =
FL(K;AL)
(1+F )


1  (1 )b
(1 w)  
(1 )
(1 w)

((1 w) b)
( r+
q()
+1)

seeing that in the Stole and Zwiebel wage equation the wage is higher than the Nash
wage equation.
We can also compare it with wage equation obtained when computing (VE VU) using
Ranjans method that is:
! =
(1  )A1 KL 
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+) n
(r+)

3.4) Calculation of the equilibrium capital demand and the equilibrium
employment equation.
From the wage equation (46) one gets
L
@!
@K
=
(1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
A1 K 1L1 
and
L
@!
@L
=
 (1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
A1 KL .
The capital demand equation is
f 0

k^

= r +  + L
@~!
@K
that is24  (1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)

35 k^ 1 = r + 
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The employment equation is
FL =

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

and with the Cobb-Douglas production function:
(1  )AKL  =

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

3.5) Existence of equilibrium in the Stole and Zwiebel case when there is
individual wage setting: Substituting the wage equation and L@!
@L
in the employment
equation on gets
(1 )AKL  =

(1 + F )  n
q()
  (1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
AKL + (1  )
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
AKL  (1 + F ) +  (r + )
q()

1 =

(1 + F )  n
q()
  
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
+ 1
(1+F )

h
1  (1 )b
(1 w)  

(1+F )
i
  

(1+F )(r+)+n
(r+)
 (1 + F ) +  (r + )
q()

(1 + F )


1  (1  )b
(1  w)  

(1 + F )

 

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

=

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

 

(1 + F )  n
q()

(1 + F )


1  (1  )b
(1  w)  

(1 + F )

 

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

= (1 ) (1 + F )+ (r + )
q()
+
n
q()
(1 + F )


1  (1  )b
(1  w)  

(1 + F )

 

(1 + F ) (r + ) + n
(r + )

= (1 ) (1 + F )+(r + (1 + n))
q()
(1 + F )


1  (1  )b
(1  w)  

(1 + F )

 

(1 + F ) +
n
(r + )

= (1 ) (1 + F )+(r + (1 + n))
q()
1  (1  )b
(1  w) 

(1 + F )
  
(1 + F )

(1 + F ) +
n
(r + )

=

(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (r + (1 + n))
q()

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1  (1  )b
(1  w) 

(1 + F )

1 +
n
(r + )

  = 
(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (r + (1 + n))
q()

1  (1  )b
(1  w) 

(1 + F )

1 +
n
(r + )

  = 
(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (r + (1 + n))
q()

Substituting x one gets
1  (1  )b
(1  w) 

(1 + F )

1 +
n
(+ x+ )

  = 
(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

and then the equilibrium employment equation in the Stole and Zwiebel case is:
(1  w) (1  ) (1 )b (1  w)
(1 + F )


1 +
n
(%+ x+ )

 =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (%+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

that one can compare with the one obtained in the Nash case that is:
(1  w) (1 )b (1  w)
(1 + F )


(%+ + (   1)x)
(%+ + x)

 =
 (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(+ + (   1)x)
q()

then the left hand side is equal to (1  w) (1  )  (1 )b (> 0 when b < (1 w))
when  = 0 and is decreasing with . The right hand side is equal to (1 ) (1  w)when
 = 0 (lower than (1  w) (1  )  (1  )b when b < (1  w)) and is increasing with
 and then both lines intersect for a positive . So an equilibrium always exists.
3.3) Calculation of @
@x
and . From the equilibrium labor market equation we have:
G(; x) = (1  w) (1  ) (1 )b (1  w)
(1 + F )


1 +
n
(%+ x+ )

  (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (%+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

= 0
then, by the implicit function theorem
@
@x
=  
dG
dx
dG
d
=  
(1 w)
(1+F )
n
(%++x)2
  (1 w)
(1+F )

q()
  (1 w)
(1+F )

h
1  n
(%+x+)
i
+ (1 w)
(1+F )
 (%+x+(1+n))q
0()
(q())2
Note that q0() < 0 and then the denominator is negative and then positive with the
minus sign, and the numerator is positive when
(1  w) 
(1 + F )
n
(%+ + x)2
  (1  w) 
(1 + F )

q()
> 0
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that is:
(1  w) 
(1 + F )
n
(%+ + x)2
>
(1  w) 
(1 + F )

q()
or
n
(%+ + x)2
>
1
q()
that is when
nq() > (%+ + x)2
and then
 <
p
nq()  %+ 
x
= 
4.1) Computation of the Stole and Zwiebel wage equation when there is
collective wage setting.
The function to maximize is:
 ln

(1  w)!   b0
r(r + + q())

L

+ (1  ) ln
0@
h
F (K;AL)
AN
  (1 + F ) !LAN
i
r   (n+ x)
1A
that gives as rst order condition:

(1  w)
((1  w)!   b0) = (1  )
(1 + F )L
[F (K;AL)  [(1 + F )]!L]
that is

(1  w) [F (K;AL)  [(1 + F )]!L]
(1 + F )L
= (1  )((1  w)!   b0)
and then

(1  w)
(1 + F )
[F (K;AL)]
L
  (1  w)! = (1  )(!   b0)
or
(1  w)!   (1  )b0) =  (1  w)
(1 + F )

F (K;AL)
L

that is
! =
(1  )
(1  w)b0 +

(1 + F )

F (K;AL)
L

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4.2) Existence of equilibrium in the Stole and Zwiebel case when there is
collective wage setting:
The wage equation is:
! = ~!(K;L) =
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )
AKL 
and then:
L
@~!
@L
=
 (1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )
AKL 
as usual the employment equation is given by:
(1  )AKL  =

(1 + F )  n
q()

L
@~!
@L
+ !

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

and substituting the wage equation and L@~!
@L
the equilibrium employment equation is:
(1 ) =

(1 + F )  n
q()
  (1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )
+
(1  w)
[(1  w)  (1  )b]

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

that is:
(1  )

1  (1  )b
(1  w)

=

(1 + F )  n
q()
  
(1 + F )
+

(1 + F )

(1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

and:
(1  )

1  (1  )b
(1  w)

=

(1 + F )

  (1 + F ) + n
q()
+ (1 + F ) + 
(r + )
q()

and nally:
(1  )

1  (1  )b
(1  w)

=

(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (r + (1 + n))
q()

substituting r one gets:
(1  )

1  (1  )b
(1  w)

=

(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

that is
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(1  ) [(1  w)  (1  )b] =  (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

then the left hand side is constant and positive when b < (1   w) when  = 0.
The right hand side is equal to (1   ) (1  w)when  = 0 ( that is lower than (1  
) [(1  w)  (1  )b] when b < (1   w) and is increasing with  and then both lines
intersect for a positive .
4.3) Calculation of @
@x
. From the equilibrium labor market equation we have:
G(; x) = (1 ) [(1  w)  (1  )b]  (1  w)
(1 + F )

(1  ) (1 + F ) + (+ x+ (1 + n))
q()

= 0
then, by the implicit function theorem
@
@x
=  
dG
dx
dG
d
=  
  (1 w)
(1+F )

q()
(1 w)
(1+F )
 (+x+(1+n))q
0()
(q())2
Note that q0() < 0 and then the denominator is negative and then positive with the
minus sign, and the numerator is negative when  > 0.
5.1) Computation of the wage equation when setting the wage knowing the
employment function when there is collective wage setting.
The program is to choose ! in order to
maximize
 ln

(1  w)!   b0
r(r + + q())

L

subject to
L =
24!
h
(1 + F ) + 
(r+ x)
q()
i
(1  )A1 
35 
1

K =

!c
(1  )A1 
  1

K = c
  1 (1 ) 1A 1  K!  1 = X!  1
that is, to maximize
 ln

(1  w)!   b0
r(r + + q())

X! 
1


The optimal wage will be the same than the one obtained maximizing the function:h
((1  w)!   b0)!  1
i
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The rst order condition is:
(1  w)!  1   1

((1  w)!   b0)!  1 1

= 0
or: 
(1  w)!  1   1

((1  w)!   b0)
!
! 
1


= 0
that simplifying gives:
(1  w) = ((1  w)!   b0)
!
that is
(1  w)! = ((1  w)!   b0)
or
(1  w)(1  )! = b0
and then the wage is:
! =
b0
(1  w)(1  )
5.2) Existence of equilibrium when setting the wage using the employment
function when there is collective wage setting.
The equilibrium labor market equation is:

(+  + x)
 
1 
=
b
(1  w)

(1 + F ) + 
(+ + (   1)x)
q()

Then the left hand side is constant and positive. The right hand side is equal to
b(1+F )
(1 w) when  = 0 ( that is lower than
h

(++x)
i 
1 
when b < ~b = (1 w)
1+F )
h

(++x)
i 
1 
and is increasing with  and then both lines intersect for a positive .
5.3) Calculation of @
@x
and computation of ~. From the equilibrium labor market
equation we have:
G(; x) =


(+  + x)
 
1 
  b
(1  w)

(1 + F ) + 
(+ + (   1)x)
q()

= 0
then, by the implicit function theorem
@
@x
=  
dG
dx
dG
d
=  
  
1 


(++x)
 
1  1 
(%++x)2
  b
(1 w)
( 1)
q()
  b
(1 w)
(++( 1)x)q0()
(q())2
Note that q0() < 0 and then the denominator is negative and then positive with the
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minus sign. If  = 1 then the numerator is negative and then there exists ~ < 1 such that
  
1 


(++~x)
 
1  1 ~
(%++~x)2
  b
(1 w)
(~ 1)
q()
= 0 and then if  < ~ and the numerator
is positive.
5.4) Derivation of the wage equation when the government has a balanced
budget constraint. Eliminating ! one gets:
1 =
(1 + ') F
(1  'F )(1  )
l
1  l
that is:
1  l = (1 + ') F
(1  'F )(1  ) l
or
1 =

1 +
(1 + ') F
(1  'F )(1  )

l
and then:
l =
1h
1 + (1+')F
(1 'F )(1 )
i :
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